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Essay
The Right to Die
Cass R. Sunstein'
In a number of cases, people with terminal illnesses are seeking to end
their lives with the aid of a physician.' Many such people suffer from
hopeless conditions of increasing debilitation, sometimes accompanied by
periods of excruciating pain. It was inevitable that circumstances of this kind
would raise constitutional questions. Two recent cases have turned the "right
to die"-or, more precisely, the right to physician-assisted suicide-into the
next great arena for the struggle to define the scope of fundamental rights
under the Due Process Clause. In Quill v. Vacco," the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit rejected the due process claim but held, somewhat
astonishingly, that New York had acted "irrationally" and hence in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause because it prohibited physician-assisted suicide
while simultaneously permitting patients to withdraw life-saving equipment. In
Compassion in Dying v. Washington,3 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held straightforwardly that a prohibition on the right to physician-
assisted suicide violates the Due Process Clause.
In this Essay, I argue that the Supreme Court should not invalidate laws
forbidding physician-assisted suicide. My basic claim is institutional: The
Court should be wary of recognizing rights of this kind amid complex issues
of fact and value, at least if reasonable people can decide those issues either
way, and if the Court cannot identify malfunctions in the system of
deliberative democracy that justify a more aggressive judicial role.- The issues
t Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Junsprudence. Uncrsity of Chicago Law
School and Department of Political Science. I am grateful to Richard Epstein. Jack Goldsmith. Daniel
Kahan, Martha Nussbaum, Richard Posner, and David Strauss for helpful comments on a preious draft.
This Essay is dedicated to the memory of my father.
1. Dr. Jack Kevorkian has been the doctor in many of the most famous cases. See. e.g., People v.
Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994); Tamar Lewin. Doctor Cleared oflturderng Woman with
Suicide Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at B6.
2. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
3. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
4. For the classic treatment, see JOHN HART ELY, DF-MOCRACY AND DSTusT (1980). 1 urge a
cautious judicial role partly because judicial judgments may be wrong and partly because judicial judgments
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presented by a right to physician-assisted suicide are especially well-suited to
a federal system, where appropriate experiments may be made, and where such
experiments are likely to provide valuable information about underlying risks.
It is particularly important that the issue of physician-assisted suicide is facing
not neglect or indifference but intense discussion in many states.5 It is far too
early for courts to preempt these processes of discussion, especially if we
consider the fact that there is no systematic barrier to a fair hearing of any
affected group. Despite appearances, the Court's current doctrines reflect this
point. Thus a general theme of this Essay is that many cases involving
"fundamental rights"-including the key privacy cases and the key equal
protection cases-are best seen not as flat declarations that the state interest
was inadequate to justify the state's intrusion, but more narrowly as
democracy-forcing outcomes designed to overcome problems of discrimination
and desuetude.
In short, the Court should say that even if it assumes that the right to
physician-assisted suicide qualifies as "fundamental" under the Due Process
Clause, a legal ban on physician-assisted suicide is constitutionally permissible
in light of the state's legitimate and weighty interests in preventing abuse,
protecting patient autonomy, and avoiding involuntary death. The Court should
reach this conclusion partly because of appropriate judicial modesty in the face
of difficult underlying questions of value and fact;6 it should emphasize these
institutional concerns in explaining its conclusion.
To present the argument in more specific and somewhat more technical
terms, it does not seem especially controversial to say that the state needs a
strong justification if it seeks to intrude on the decision of a competent adult
to terminate his life under medically hopeless and physically painful
conditions.7 But it is extremely difficult either to describe the standard for
"fundamental rights" that emerges from the existing cases or to tell whether
may cause serious social problems even if they are right. See infra text accompanying notes 129-33. By
"recognizing rights," I mean invalidating legislation; as suggested below, I do think these cases are an
appropriate setting for recognizing a presumptive right, in the sense that the state should be required to
bring forward a strong justification for any intrusion.
5. Washington, for example, enacted its governing law in 1992, and Governor Cuomo of New York
sponsored a widely discussed Task Force report in 1994 that rejected legalization of physician-assisted
suicide. See Quill, 80 F.3d at 734-35 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (describing New York background);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing discussion in New
York and Michigan), rev'd, Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d 790.
6. There is an extensive philosophical literature on the right to die. A particularly illuminating
discussion is DAN W. BROCK, LIFE AND DEATH 202-30 (1993), which argues for autonomy right and
challenges the distinction between withdrawal of treatment and active euthanasia. See also RONALD
DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 218-41 (1993) (arguing for autonomy right); John Keown, Euthanasia in the
Netherlands: Sliding down the Slippery Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 261, 261-62 (John Keown ed.,
1995) (collecting various positions about whether voluntary euthanasia will lead to involuntary euthanasia).
As will become apparent, the philosophical issue is far from coextensive with the constitutional issue, and
there is a limit to how much progress can be made through philosophical discussion alone; many of the
key questions are empirical, involving the real-world effects of the relevant right.
7. For the moment I put to one side some of the definitional issues.
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the right to physician-assisted suicide qualifies as "fundamental" under those
cases. We might want to read current law to say that there is a presumptive
right8 against government intrusion into a decision whether to terminate one's
life under hopeless conditions or, alternatively and more broadly, a
presumptive right against nontrivial government-imposed intrusions into the
physical space of one's own body. In some cases, the right to physician-
assisted suicide certainly meets the former standard, and while it does not quite
meet the latter-it is a right "to" invasion, not a right "from" invasion-that
right should probably be taken as close enough to the rights established by the
existing case law to qualify as "fundamental" for constitutional purposes when
the patient faces medically hopeless conditions. At the very least, it would be
reasonable for the Court to make this assumption for purposes of decision.
But-and this is the central point-the state has an array of strong
justifications for intruding on that right. These justifications involve the risk
of abuse by doctors and others and the danger that a right to physician-assisted
suicide would, in practice, decrease rather than increase patient autonomy.
The state may believe, for example, that recognition of the right would
allow people suffering from depression and distorted judgment to terminate
their lives when their judgments should not readily be trusted; that a right to
physician-assisted suicide would discourage people from dealing more
productively with their distress and with the fact of death; that the line between
hopeless and hopeful conditions is too thin in practice and that any right to
physician-assisted suicide would thus produce premature deaths; that at least
some doctors, carrying a great deal of authority and faced with multiple
demands on their time, would present death as an option in such a way that
some patients would have a hard time refusing; that some well-meaning
families would impose irresistible pressures on terminal patients to "choose"
death; or that any such right would have harmful effects on the performance
and norms of the medical profession and perhaps on the norms of the citizenry
in general. On some of these counts, the right to remove life-sustaining
equipment is quite different from the right to physician-assisted suicide,
because the latter creates far more serious risks of abuse. At least relevant in
this regard is the fact that numerous doctors-aware of the underlying
risks-oppose a right to physician-assisted suicide.'" In these circumstances,
the Supreme Court should decline to impose a national solution.
8. It is presumptive in the sense that government can overcome the nght with a showing of a
sufficiently strong interest.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 143-45.
10. SeeA Review of Assisted Suicide. WASH. POST. Oct. 3. 1996. at A28. Plus News, CHI, SUSN.TIMES.
June 25, 1996, at 3 (noting American Medical Association members voted "overwhelmingly- not to change
AMA's opposition to physician-assisted suicide); see also Willard Gaylin et al.. Doctors Must Nor Kill. 259
JAMA 2139 (1988) (arguing against active euthanasia). But see Judy Foreman. Assisted Suicide Seen
Gaining Favor, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. I, 1996, at 3.
1997] 1125
HeinOnline  -- 106 Yale L.J. 1125 1996-1997
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 1123
This is emphatically not an argument against physician-assisted suicide as
a matter of public policy. Many of the individual cases present powerful
arguments for respecting the patient's wishes. A reader of those cases and the
relevant literature may well conclude (as I would) that, in the end, states
should probably allow physician-assisted suicide-because strong autonomy
interests favor the right, social and familial interests support the right, the risks
that trouble opponents of the right may not be as severe as they appear, and
those risks can be handled through procedural safeguards short of denying the
right." Eventually, it may be predicted that the United States and other
nations will indeed come to recognize a right to physician-assisted suicide
under appropriate conditions, accompanied by procedural safeguards. 12 While
any judgment must be tentative, I believe that this is likely to be a salutary
development.'3 What I am suggesting is that these claims do not support
recognition of such a judgment as a matter of constitutional law.
I. SOME CLARIFICATIONS
The "right to die" might be asserted in a number of circumstances. 4 Of
course, the term might refer to the interest in withdrawing life-sustaining
equipment. The interest in doing so appears to have been recognized as having
presumptive constitutional status in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health,'5 in the sense that the state must come forward with a strong
I1. See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 235-45 (1995) (arguing on behalf of right to
physician-assisted suicide); see also Keown, supra note 6, at 263-66 (describing controversial safeguards
in Netherlands). Keown identifies safeguards requiring that the request must come from the patient and be
free and voluntary; the request must be well-considered, durable, and persistent; the patient must be
intolerably suffering, with no hope of improvement; euthanasia must be the last resort, after other
alternatives have failed; euthanasia must be performed by the physician; the physician must consult with
another physician trained in the field; and the death record should not indicate death of "natural causes."
These safeguards are controversial because it is not clear that they are respected in practice. See id.; see
also HERBERT HENDIN, SEDUCED BY DEATH 47-95 (1997).
12. A recent referendum in Oregon has produced a fight of this sort, accompanied by procedures
whose constitutional adequacy is in doubt. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). In 1988,
there was a failed effort to produce a referendum on this topic in California; in November 1991,
Washington voters rejected a highly publicized referendum proposal to legalize active euthanasia. See
BROCK, supra note 6, at 203.
13. It is most unfortunate that American constitutional law lacks a kind of "democratic political
question doctrine"-a doctrine that would allow the Court to decline to validate or invalidate legislation,
and to suspend its judgment about constitutionality until a certain period of democratic deliberation (and
clarification of relevant issues) has passed. The Court can deny certiorari, of course, and there are analogues
in American law to such a doctrine, see infra Section IV.C (discussing desuetude and associated doctrines),
but the idea has no explicit constitutional foundation. Such a doctrine would be especially well-suited to
the right to physician-assisted suicide.
14. A helpful discussion can be found in DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 218-41, which argues on behalf
of an autonomy right.
15. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The Court said:
The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions .... Although
we think the logic of the cases ... would embrace such a liberty interest (in resisting the forced
administration of life-sustaining medical treatment], the dramatic consequences involved in
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justification for intruding on that interest. In any case, many states allow
citizens to decline medical treatment.'
6
The distinction between the right to withdraw life-sustaining equipment
and the right to physician-assisted suicide is problematic in many ways, 7 but
here I am speaking of cases that involve more than the withdrawal of
treatment. Consider the following possibilities, designed to give a sense of the
range of factual contexts in which the right might be claimed. (1) A competent
patient seeks death under conditions that are both medically hopeless, in the
sense that the best medical judgment is that there is a fixed and relatively short
time to live, and physically difficult and debilitating, in the sense that the
patient will experience some intense pain. 8 (2) A competent patient seeks
death under conditions that are medically hopeless, but do not involve much
physical pain. (3) A competent patient with a disease that will produce a long
period of deterioration and a long span of life-Alzheimer's disease is the
most familiar example-seeks to terminate her life at some stage before the
deterioration becomes serious. (4) A patient may be unconscious or otherwise
incompetent and also in a medically hopeless state; his family or guardian
seeks death, with or without evidence that this would be the patient's desire.
These might be called cases of nonvoluntary euthanasia, as distinguished from
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. (5) A competent patient may be facing
a severe medical problem. Though his condition is not utterly hopeless, he may
seek death because he is generally depressed or no longer considers life worth
living. (6) A patient may be facing a period of sustained medical difficulty
without knowing whether or not some improvement is eventually possible. His
condition is therefore considerably better than in (5), but he seeks death
because he no longer considers life worth living. (7) Any of the above
conditions might involve a person who seeks death, not with the assistance of
a physician, but with the assistance of a friend or family member.
refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the deprivation of that interest
is constitutionally permissible. But for purposes of this case. %e assume that the United States
Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right o refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
Id. at 278-79. Justice O'Connor was much clearer on this point. See id at 289 (O'Connor. J . concurrng)
("[Tihe liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause must protect. if it protects an) thing. an individual's
deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including the artificial dehery of food and %ater.")
16. See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 727-28 (2d Cir.). cert. granted. 117 S. Ct 36 (1996)
(describing New York statutes allowing patients to decline treatment).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74.
18. It has been suggested that modem pain management techniques make this an unlikely ccnt For
example, Brock writes:
There are not great numbers of patients undergoing severe suffenng that can only be
relieved by directly killing them. Modem methods of pain management enable physicians and
nurses to control the pain of virtually all such patients without the use of lethal poisons. though
often at the cost of so sedating the patient that interaction and communication with others is
limited or no longer possible.
BROCK, supra note 6, at 170.
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These various situations present quite different issues. In case (4), there is
a question about whether we have sufficient reason to believe the third party's
judgment about the patient's desires. In case (5), the problem is not so
different from that of ordinary suicide: The patient has some decent life
prospects but nonetheless seeks to terminate his life. In some of the highly
publicized recent cases, it has been feared that doctors have brought about
death simply because the patient is suffering from intense depression.' 9 Case
(6) is close to case (5), with even more features of ordinary suicide. In case
(7), we may fear that medical judgments are playing an insufficiently large role
in the outcome, that the case is in that sense close to ordinary suicide, or that
there is too large a risk of abuse because of the absence of professional norms
and professional involvement.
20
For present purposes, let us accept the following propositions. First, it can
sometimes be hard to know, in the real world, whether a case qualifies as (1),
(2), (3), (4), (5), or (6). The difficulty of making such distinctions bears on the
desirability of a constitutional ruling: If apparent category (1) cases actually
fall in category (6), perhaps a flat ban on physician-assisted suicide,
accompanied by the good-faith exercise of prosecutorial discretion (protecting
against arrests and indictments in the most excusable cases), makes a good
deal of sense. Second, the state has a legitimate reason to make sure that any
third party representation about the patient's wishes is actually reliable. When
the patient has not consented, we have involuntary or nonvoluntary euthanasia,
and it is safe to assume that the state has an especially strong interest in
ensuring against involuntary or nonvoluntary deaths. 2'
Third, and perhaps most importantly and more contentiously, let us assume
that there is no constitutional barrier to laws forbidding ordinary suicide and
ordinary assisted suicide, and hence that in categories (5) and (6) there is no
constitutional problem.22 Let us accept this conclusion partly because of
precedent23 and partly on the theory that the state has extremely strong
19. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay oil Roe, Casey, and
the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 803, 824-25 (1995) (noting New York State Task Force on Life and
the Law's opposition to physician-assisted suicide based in part on fact that majority of individuals who
commit suicide suffer from depression and most doctors are not adequately trained to diagnose depression
in complex cases such as terminal illness).
20. See BROCK, supra note 6, at 229-30.
21. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990). Note that there is
a pervasive concern that if physician-assisted suicide is permitted, there will inevitably be physician-chosen
death instead. See infra Sections II.C-D.
22. This is a legal claim, not a philosophical one. There has been a long debate about the philosophical
issues raised by suicide. See Miriam Griffin, Philosophy, Cato, and Roman Suicide: I1, 33 GREECE & ROME
192 (1986).
23. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 ("[Tlhe majority of States in this country have laws imposing
criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State is required to
remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically able adult to starve to
death."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973) (suggesting that laws banning suicide
are constitutionally unproblematic).
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interests in encouraging a general commitment to the continuation of life and
in protecting people from engaging in behavior that may be myopic or a
product of short-term depression or distortions in judgment. Some of the
strongest cases for public interference with private judgments involve myopia,
cognitive error or motivational problems, or similar distortions. It is easy to
imagine cases in which people facing severe temporary (or not so temporary)
distress are inclined to seek a way out, and there is extremely good reason for
social norms-and laws both expressing and fortifying those social
norms-discouraging such people from terminating their lives. Suicide may
seem the only solution to the experience of intolerable suffering, perhaps
occasioned by some disastrous or life-transforming event (death of a loved one,
involuntary separation, divorce); but the suffering may be far more short-term
and far more remediable than it seems.2'4 The norms directed against suicide
and assisted suicide have a salutary function in encouraging people to deal
with even the most severe problems in a more constructive fashion; part of the
salutary function of the relevant norms and laws is to block serious thought of
suicide in cases where it appears to be the only or the simplest solution. In
fact, it is possible that in many cases those who are "assisting" suicide are
actually urging or at least legitimating it.2 A decent society seeks to inculcate
a strong norm in favor of preserving life even when things seem extremely
bad. It does so especially in view of the fact that suicide seems remarkably
contagious. Highly publicized suicides can create bandwagon or cascade
effects.26
Of course we can also imagine cases in which a suicide may be warranted
and in which assistance in suicide is morally acceptable and perhaps morally
responsible, even in category (5). But in such cases, criminal prosecutions are
quite unlikely, and even if there are such prosecutions, the relevant laws are
generally acceptable on constitutional grounds, and that proposition is
sufficient for my purposes here. I will deal, then, principally with cases falling
in categories (1) and (2), for these are the most insistent ones for a
constitutional "right to die." They also provide the factual settings behind both
Quill and Compassion in Dying.
These points suggest a possible problem with right-to-die litigation, one
that points to the distorting lens of adjudication. The particular cases brought
to a court's attention will certainly be the most compelling ones. They will
involve competent patients facing horrible life prospects and perhaps intense
pain. A focus on the particular cases will make the right seem particularly
insistent, and this will be a fully reasonable reaction to those cases. But a
24. See HFNDIN, supra note I1, at 216; HERBERT HENDIN. SUICIDE IN AMERICA (1995)
25. See HENDIN, supra note II. at 80-95.
26. See David P. Phillips, The Influence of Suggestion on Suicide: Substantte and Theore tcal
Implications of the Werther Effect, 39 AM. SOC, REV. 340 (1974).
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decision in these particular patients' favor will undoubtedly affect other people
not before the court, and those cases will be much more difficult. Very
poignant and compelling particular cases should not be allowed to stand for the
whole of the problem.
An additional point by way of clarification: Medical practice will operate
in the shadow of the law and will be influenced by the law without, however,
simply tracking the law. Thus a legal system lacking an actual or formally
recognized "right to die" may well make space (even quasi-official space) for
physician judgments about whether to prolong life or hasten death in some
quiet, not widely advertised way, usually made in close consultation with the
patient and family members. For example, a doctor may administer painkillers
that will make death come sooner, allow a patient not to take life-sustaining
medicines or even food and water, or avoid "extraordinary" measures.27 The
line between these steps and physician-assisted suicide seems thin and it is
undoubtedly breached in practice. It is imaginable that patients often exercise
an informal "right to die" regardless of the illegality of physician-assisted
suicide. Of course the technical illegality is important; no one should feel
entirely comfortable in committing an unlawful act. But the fact that social
practice can outrun law is important for courts to keep in mind; it suggests that
informal practice may already be creating a right where it is especially
insistent, even if the law is otherwise. 28 The content of law depends not
merely on the statute books but also on prosecutorial practice, and it is safe to
say that in many cases prosecutors do not and will not devote their limited
resources to the most benign cases of voluntary active euthanasia. The
availability of informal practice and informally agreed-upon "rights" should
relieve some of the pressure for a constitutional guarantee,29 at least if it
appears that those rights will be recognized in some or many cases in category
(1) and (2) contexts. With these notes let us now turn to the constitutional
issue.
27. See POSNER, supra note II, at 236.
28. Cf ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (discussing people's capacity to order
their lives without reference to law).
29. Abortion is an interesting analogy along this dimension. Even without Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), and even in places where abortion is unlawful, abortions occur, sometimes in large numbers. See
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 278 (1993). But this is not much of an argument against
Roe, since the relevant abortions tend to be extremely dangerous. See id. The term "back-alley butchers"
reflects the point. In the case of physician-assisted suicide, there is a weaker parallel in the informal
processes I am describing. No one should deny, however, that the ban on physician-assisted suicide can
produce some ugly informal outcomes. Compassion in Dying presents an example:
When he realized that my family was going to be away for a day, he wrote us a beautiful letter,
went down to his basement, and shot himself with his 12 gauge shot gun. He was 84 .... My
son-in-law then had the unfortunate and unpleasant task of cleaning my father's splattered brains
off the basement walls.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 834-35 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (citation omitted), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
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II. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT?
Under the Court's cases, the first question is whether the right to die,
understood as a right to physician-assisted suicide in category (1) and (2)
cases, qualifies as a "fundamental right" or "liberty interest, '"31 such that a
state must show an especially strong reason for interfering with it. My ultimate
suggestion is that the Court would do best to assume, without holding, that the
relevant right so qualifies. Hence the discussion to follow is in a sense
gratuitous; I will be arguing that the Court should put to one side the
extraordinary complexities and proceed directly to the issue of justification.
But the underlying issue is important, difficult, and of great intrinsic interest,
and if the Court does answer the question, I suggest that it should conclude
that the right to physician-assisted suicide is presumptively protected either (a)
because there is a presumptive right to choose whether to live or die under
medically hopeless conditions; or (b) because the cases establish a presumptive
right to prevent physical invasions of one's own body, and the right to
physician-assisted suicide is close enough to this established right to qualify
as presumptively protected as well.
The source of the doctrinal difficulty is that the Court has not-to say the
least-given clear criteria for deciding when a right qualifies as a liberty
interest. The cases leave a great deal of ambiguity and the doctrine lacks much
coherence. Consider Table 1.
Is it possible to make sense of this set of results? There are two common
ways of reading the cases. One reading, which played a large role in Quill and
in the Compassion in Dying dissent, is that the Court has issued a firm "no
more" and is unwilling to recognize additional fundamental rights unless they
find specific and extremely strong recognition in Anglo-American traditions .3
The other reading, reflected in the majority opinion in Compassion in Dying,
is that the cases should be taken to establish a presumptive right to
noninterference with decisions that are "highly personal and intimate, '2
especially if those decisions involve the use of one's body. Unfortunately,
30. I will use the two terms interchangeably. There is. howsever. a technical difference If the Court
finds a "fundamental fight," the state may intrude only on a showing that it has chosen the least restnctive
means of promoting a compelling state interest. See. e.g.. Roe. 410 U.S. at 155 It is unclear whether the
identification of a "liberty interest" has the same consequence, It is notable that in Cnrzon v- Director
Missouri Department of Health, the Court spoke of a "liberty interest'" rather than a fundamental nght. see
497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990). though it is not clear that this was intended as a distinction
31. The plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). strongly supports this
view: "We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection
to, the asserted right can be identified." Id. at 127 n.6. Interestingly. the plurality found consistency with
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt %- Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). by saying
that such cases did not acknowledge "a longstanding and still extant societal tradition withholding the very
right pronounced to be the subject of [the] liberty interest." 491 U.S. at 127 Thus. in those cases, there was
no tradition of state enforcement of laws withholding the liberty interest "continuing to the present day"
Id. This idea bears on the notion of desuetude. See infra text accompanying notes 150-52.
32. 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted. 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996)
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TABLE 1. HOLDINGS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS CASES
SUBJECT OF CASE QUALIFIES AS FUNDAMENTAL DOES NOT QUALIFY AS
INTEREST FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST
Use of Contraceptives Griswold v. Connecticut;"
Eisenstadt v. Baird34
Access to Contraceptives Carey v. Population Servs. Int'13
Abortion Roe v. Wade'
Heterosexual Sodomy [Bowers v. Hardwick] 37  [Bowers v. Hardwick]
Prevention of Compulsory Skinner v. Oklahoma
Sterilization
Homosexual Sodomy Bowers v. Hardwick
3 9
Avoidance of Life-Saving Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't
Medical Treatment of Health'
Avoidance of Administration Washington v. Harper4'
of Antipsychotic Drugs
Paternal Visits to Child Michael H. v. Gerald D.
42
Conceived Out of Wedlock
Live with Family Members Moore v. City of East Cleveland
43
Live with Friends Village of Belle Terre v.
BoraasM
Marriage Loving v. Virginia;
45  Califano v. Jobs 4 7
Zablocki v. Redhail'
neither of these readings holds out much promise; both are far too crude. As
we will see, the "no-more-except-for-tradition" reading does not fit the cases
very well, and it also lacks much appeal in principle. On the other hand, the
terms "personal" and "intimate" are far too broad; they create too many
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
478 U.S. 186 (1986). The Court did not resolve the issue of heterosexual sodomy.
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding fundamental right under Equal Protection Clause).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
491 U.S. 110 (1989).
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding fundamental right under Equal Protection Clause).
434 U.S. 47 (1977).
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ambiguities and lead in too many unhelpful directions. This is not the occasion
for a full discussion of these points-I cannot attempt to sort out the modem
doctrine of substantive due process in this space4-but a few notations will
be helpful.
A. Tradition
On occasion, influential Justices and the Court as a whole have said that
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause qualify as such largely
because of their origins in Anglo-American traditions, understood at a level of
considerable specificity. 9 Let us for the moment assume that this is the case.
If the right to physician-assisted suicide must emerge from such traditions, the
case is relatively simple: There is no such right. The right to physician-assisted
suicide is not something that Anglo-American law traditionally protects.' Of
course suicide and assisted suicide have been banned by tradition. 5' Perhaps
we could say that Anglo-American practice with respect to suicide is complex,
not simple, because enforcement has often been lacking and because physician-
assisted suicide is a novel phenomenon; 2 perhaps we could say that tradition
yields no clear judgment that suicide is to be banned in the distinctive
circumstances that we are discussing. But even if this is true, and hence the
tradition does not speak with clarity, it would be implausible to suggest that
our tradition affirmatively supports a right to terminate one's life with the help
of a doctor. From the standpoint of Anglo-American traditions, a ban on the
use of contraceptives within marriage may well count as anomalous;"' so too
48. For relevant discussions, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF. O READING TlE
CONsTrrLToN (1991), which challenges traditionalism in constitutional law; JIM Balkin. Tradition.
Betrayal, and the Politics of Deconstruction. II CARDOZO L. REv. 1613 (1990). which argues that
traditions are indeterminate; and Jed Rubenfeld. The Right of Privacy. 102 HARV. L REv. 737 (1989).
which argues for broad privacy right not rooted in tradition.
49. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110. 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.)
(discussing right of adulterous natural father as not rooted in specific tradition); Bowers v. Hardwick. 478
U.S. 186, 192-95 (1986) (White, J.) (discussing lack of specific tradition supporting right to consensual
sodomy); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494. 503-06 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell. J.)
(discussing need to ground rights in tradition and sanctity of family tradition); Gnsold v. Connecticut.
381 U.S. 479, 501-02 (1965) (Harlan. J., concurring) (discussing need to ground fundamental rights in
"continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society").
50. See, for example, Justice Scalia's discussion in Cruzan v Director Missouri Department of Health.
497 U.S. 261, 294-95 (1990), of the historical English legal reason for the prohibition on suicide, and a
similar discussion in Compassion in Dying v. Washington. 79 F.3d 790. 806-10 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cerr.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
51. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294-95 (discussing Anglo-American reasoning against prohibition).
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 808-10 (discussing Greco-Roman and Anglo-American reasoning).
52. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 236-37 (discussing rarity of reporting): id. at 251-52 (discussing
rarity of enforcement).
53. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman. 367 U5.S 497, 522,
539-45 (1961) (Harlan. J., dissenting) (arguing that ban on use of contraceptives within marriage should
be invalidated partly because it is so anomalous and so at odds with tradition)).
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may a ban on the right of a grandparent to live with her child; 4 but the same
cannot be said about the right to physician-assisted suicide.
If the right to die must be rooted in tradition, then it does not qualify as
a fundamental interest.5 But there are severe problems with understanding
fundamental interests solely by reference to tradition, specifically described.
The first problem is that many of the Court's cases cannot be understood in
purely traditionalist terms, and hence the traditionalist understanding of the
privacy cases fits poorly with existing law. Roe v. Wade56 is the clearest
example; there is no clear tradition establishing a right to abortion. 7 But this
is true not only of abortion. From the standpoint of tradition, a large number
of the Court's cases make little sense. The cases establishing a right to
contraceptives outside of marriage8 do not vindicate a longstanding tradition.
Nor is there any general right to marry within Anglo-American traditions;
hence Loving v. Virginia59 and Zablocki v. RedhaiP' fit poorly with due
process traditionalism. Traditions, taken at a level of great specificity and as
brute facts, do not support the right to physician-assisted suicide, but they also
explain few of the key cases, and hence traditionalism does not make sense of
existing law.
Should the Court consider its own decisions doubtful and use
traditionalism in the future notwithstanding its inconsistency with past
decisions? This course, suggested by both Bowers v. Hardwick6l and the
plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,62 might be deemed reasonable
if traditionalism were extremely appealing in principle and if the alternatives
were unacceptable. Perhaps a firm "no more!" would make sense despite its
failure to fit with existing law; Hardwick's cavalier treatment of precedent in
particular implies a judgment of this sort. But if we assume that at least some
63kind of substantive due process is legitimate, as all of the Justices appear
54. See Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (plurality opinion).
55. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 724-25 (2d Cir.) (rejecting view that right to die qualifies as
"fundamental" on ground that tradition does not recognize that right), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
57. The Court's own discussion in Roe establishes as much. See id. at 130-41 (discussing conflicting
and unclear historical rules on abortion).
58. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down law prohibiting sale of
contraceptives to minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down as irrational law
forbidding sale of contraceptives to unmarried people).
59. 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967) (invalidating antimiscegenation law that had historical roots in colonial
period).
60. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating law forbidding people to marry unless they have met their
support obligations).
61. 478 U.S. 186, 192-96 (1986) (discussing lack of historical basis for right to consensual sodomy).
62. 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (defending use of specific
historical traditions relating to adulterous natural father rather than parenthood more generally).
63. Of course the whole idea of "substantive due process" is quite doubtful as a matter of text and
history. See ELY, supra note 4, at 14-18 (arguing that interpretation of Due Process Clause as incorporating
general mandate to review substantive merits of government action "not only was not inevitable, it was
probably wrong"). But we might see that idea as doing the work of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
which could plausibly have been used for an enterprise of this kind. See Charles Fairman, Does the
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to assume, we will find large problems with using traditions, narrowly and
specifically conceived, as the sole source of rights under the Due Process
Clause. To be sure, such a use of tradition does help to discipline judicial
discretion, and that is an important gain.64 And if traditions were
systematically reliable as sources of rights, and if judges thinking more
independently about the appropriate content of rights were systematically
unreliable, due process traditionalism might be justified on rule-utilitarian
grounds. That is, due process traditionalism might be justified as a way of
minimizing aggregate judicial errors65 even if it were quite imperfect as a
source of rights.
But this is not a very plausible view, for there is no reason to think that
traditions, understood at a level of great specificity, are systematically reliable
or so close to systematically reliable as to exclude a somewhat more reflective
and critical judicial role.66 Anglo-American traditions, so understood, include
a great deal of good but also significant confusion and injustice (consider, for
example, bans on racial intermarriage); it is appropriate for courts to engage
in at least a degree of critical scrutiny of intrusions on liberty even if those
intrusions do not offend tradition. Nor is there sufficient reason to think that
judges will inevitably do very badly if they think critically about rights. Of
course judges should be very cautious about rejecting judgments made by
elected officials; of course judges should avoid hubris in examining the past.
Certainly it is plausible to think that judges should generally proceed
incrementally and in good common law fashion from previous decisions.67 It
also makes sense to say that substantive due process should be used
sparingly.68 Understandings of this kind provide important constraints on
judicial power under the Due Process Clause. But at the very least it is right
to ask whether the interest said to qualify as a fundamental right is, in
principle, at all different from rights that have been sanctified by tradition. If,
for example, there were no relevant difference, in principle, between a
traditionally unrecognized right to physician-assisted suicide and (let us
suppose) a traditionally recognized right to resist treatment, courts should not
say that the latter is constitutionally protected and the former is not.
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5. 9-15 (1949) (discussing
historical development of limited Privileges and Immunities Clause).
64. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 n.6 (plurality opinion of Scalia. J.) (arguing that traditions
should be characterized at level of greatest specificity).
65. Due process traditionalism might be thought to minimize decision costs too. at least if it is
relatively simple to identify traditions.
66. See Cass Sunstein, Against Tradition, 13 SOC. PHIL & POLY 207 t1996) (challenging idea that
tradition is good source of rights).
67. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation. 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
877 (1996) (defending idea that constitutional law is form of common law).
68. See infra Section IV.A.
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B. Dignity, Bodily Integrity, Intimacy
If tradition is not decisive, what is the source of fundamental rights for
purposes of substantive due process? This is one of the largest unanswered
questions in American jurisprudence, and it would be foolish to attempt a full
answer here. But terms such as "intimate" and "personal" provide too little
help. They tend to be conclusions masquerading as analytic devices. In any
case, some of the cases deny protection to interests that seem highly intimate
and highly personal; consider both Hardwick and Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas.69 Thus the Court's cases refuse to accept the view that intimate and
personal decisions deserve constitutional protection as such.
Putting previous cases to one side, we can see that some decisions that
seem intimate and personal are not strong candidates for constitutional
protection; consider the decision to work longer than the maximum hour laws
allow in order to provide for one's family, the decision to take medicines or
drugs of a certain sort, the decision to marry one's cousin or aunt, or for that
matter, the decision to commit suicide. Thus a reference to "intimacy" or
"control of one's body" seems unhelpful. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit placed emphasis on the interest in promoting death "with dignity.'7
°
There is indeed a strong political argument for a right to physician-assisted
suicide grounded in this concern. But it is unclear what the notion adds to the
due process argument.
C. Life and Death Decisions Under Narrowly Defined Conditions
As we will see, the relevant cases seem to depend not simply on deciding
that an interest has considerable importance, but also on at least implicit
problems of procedural due process or equal protection, problems that suggest
an underlying defect in democratic processes themselves. 7, It is extremely
difficult to produce any verbal formula that is satisfactory, consistent with
current law, and adequate to resolve the issue of physician-assisted suicide. For
this reason, it would be best for the Court simply to assume that the right
qualifies as fundamental and to proceed from there to the question of
justification; 72 at least this course would make sense if the justification is
sufficient, as I will argue.
69. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding New York village ordinance as valid land-use legislation addressed
to family needs).
70. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S.
Ct. 37 (1996).
71. See text accompanying notes 113-33.
72. See Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996) (defending judicial
minimalism in midst of complex issues of fact and value).
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But if the Court wanted to be more ambitious, it might venture a
tentative alternative. The Court might say very narrowly that Cruzan should
be read to recognize a presumptive right to make a choice about whether to
live or die when one is suffering from a medically hopeless condition. Such a
right would recognize that this choice is as central to individual self-
determination as any that one can imagine; and if conditions are medically
hopeless, it is harder, at least, to say that a state prohibition helps counteract
individual irrationality. The existence of such a right would be important not
only for people who are now dying but also for people not facing such
conditions, who would be able to rest secure that if their condition became
unbearable, they would have power to end it." Thus the Court might put to
one side the issues raised by "dignity" and "intimacy" and rely instead on self-
determination as the source of constitutional doctrine; it might conclude that
whatever may fall in that category, the right to die when one is facing a
terminal illness certainly does so. Such a right would also recognize that it is
hard, in principle, to distinguish between withdrawal of life-saving equipment
and category (1) and (2) cases,74 if we put to one side the risks of abuse
discussed below. Those risks go not to the question of whether there is a right
in the first instance, but to the separate issue of whether government has an
adequate justification for intruding on the right.
A narrow right of this kind would avoid many of the problems created
by a general right to suicide. A large advantage of defining the presumptive
right in this narrow way is that it would avoid the various puzzles created by
any broader reading of the privacy cases. Perhaps the principal difficulties with
such a definition are that the term "medically hopeless" is vague, the notion
of "self-determination" leaves many open questions, and the line between
terminal and nonterminal illnesses can be indistinct in practice.
D. Bodily Invasion
Suppose that the Court sought to be more ambitious and to introduce
somewhat more order to the cases. It could find a principle of some appeal,
and considerable consistency with the cases, if it said that there is a
presumptive right against government authorization of nontrivial physical
invasions into a person's body. A government authorization may be found
when the law allows invasions by government officials or when law forbids
people from fending off physical invasions by private persons. This basic
idea-intended as a statement of a sufficient, if not necessary, condition for a
fundamental interest-explains the notion that people have a presumptive right
73. See POSNER, supra note II. at 239-40 (characterizing value of right of suicide as -option")
74. Interestingly, Justice Scalia made this very argument in his separate opinion in Cruzan v Director
Missouri Department of Healih, 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (1990) (Scalia. J.. concumng) This claim does not.
however, mean that the distinction fails rationality review. See infra Subsection IV B I
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to resist the involuntary administration of drugs.75 It accounts for the
widespread intuition that there would be serious constitutional issues if the
government undertook medical experiments on people against their will or
required them to have operations for their own good. It helps account for
Cruzan as well, though the Court did not announce a general right against
physical invasions of a person's body.
Less obviously, the standard helps explain both Roe v. Wade and the
cases involving governmental efforts to prevent people from diminishing risks
of pregnancy. In these cases, the government is preventing people from taking
steps to prevent a physical invasion of their bodies via pregnancy. The key
point, then, is that a pregnancy is a physical invasion, and if government wants
to prevent people from fending off that invasion, it needs a special
justification.76 A particular advantage of the standard is that it helps explain
why the Court has struck down laws involving contraception and abortion
without saying that there is a right to engage in sexual activity as such; the
Court has been careful to say that the Constitution does not prohibit laws
forbidding fornication and adultery,77 and it has restricted its holdings to state
efforts to control fornication and adultery indirectly by creating a risk of
pregnancy. The suggested standard thus distinguishes Hardwick, on the ground
that there is no prohibition on the regulation of sexual conduct if pregnancy
and childbirth are not at risk. In any event, the standard seems to provide a
sufficient if not necessary condition for constitutional concern; there do not
appear to be any cases that fail to find a constitutionally protected interest in
cases in which the standard is met.
78
Of course this standard does not answer all imaginable questions, and this
fact argues against its judicial adoption in a case that does not require the
Court to attempt to make sense of its privacy doctrine, which undoubtedly
consists of a number of incompletely theorized judgments 79 not easily
reconciled with one another. The notion of "physical invasion" is vague. We
75. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 219-27 (1990) (holding that Due Process Clause permits
state to administer antipsychotic drugs to prisoner against his will despite significant liberty interest in
avoiding such administration of drugs).
76. This point is intended as a description, not as a full defense of the cases and especially not of a
full defense of Roe v. Wade. See EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABOTON DEADLOCK (1996).
for an effort to defend Roe in these terms. Note also that it is possible to think that any physical invasion
is legitimate either because the invasion is the product of the woman's voluntary actions or because
protection of the fetus counts as sufficient justification. These points bear on the question of whether
government may intrude on the right as I have understood it.
77. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,448 (1972); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
78. Criminal law sanctions might be thought to raise difficulties for this standard, but the appearance
is misleading. The suggested standard is about literal invasion, not about confinement. In any case, it is
well understood that the state needs a strong justification for depriving people of liberty; violations of the
criminal law ordinarily provide that justification.
79. On incompletely theorized judgments, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT 35-61 (1996); and Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733 (1995).
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can start with core or defining cases in which government officials or private
actors are authorized literally to invade bodily space-Cruzan and Washington
v. Harper ° are examples-but hard questions can easily be imagined, in
which it is unclear whether there is a physical invasion.8' Some of the
modem due process cases finding fundamental rights do not meet the standard;
the right to marry"2 and the right to live with one's grandchild13 are
examples. Moreover, I have not explained what is special about the physical
invasion of one's own body. The best answer might begin with an
understanding of the time-honored nature of that right in Anglo-American law;
tradition affords a special place to the individual's right to prevent invasion of
his body. The right to self-defense can itself be understood in these terms.
Even if tradition is not decisive, for reasons suggested above, it plainly matters
under existing law, and it tends to support the right described here. Tradition
aside, protection of one's body against external intrusion provides the most
primitive and basic sense of personal security and independence. In this way,
the right to prevent physical invasions can be seen as the most central and
defining case of a series of familiar rights, including the right to private
property itself.84
Does this standard support the right to physician-assisted suicide?
Understood minimally, the standard seems not to create any such right. In such
cases, the state is attempting to prevent a physical invasion. It is not itself
undertaking a physical invasion, or making it impossible for people to stop a
physical invasion from other private parties. Instead, the government is
attempting to forbid people from allowing their bodies to be physically
invaded. Thus the suggested standard seems to create a right to withdraw life-
saving equipment without creating a right to physician-assisted suicide. But
there are two problems with this conclusion. First, as discussed above, some
cases find a fundamental right even without a bodily invasion. Second, the
distinction between withdrawal of life-saving equipment and physician-assisted
suicide raises some serious conceptual issues, involving perhaps intractable
distinctions between actions and omissions. Does it make sense to say that
people have a constitutional right to resist physical invasions without also
saying that they have a constitutional right to bring about physical invasions?
In other words, we might say that the former implies the latter, so that people
have a presumptive right to decide whether or not their bodies will be
80. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
81. It would follow from what I have said that a grant of permission to rape or assault would be
constitutionally suspect. By contrast, a broad right of sexual autonomy need not follow; by prevenung
various sexual relations, the state certainly does not allow invasions of the body in the way I am describing
here.
82. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
83. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
84. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 177-83 (1990) (discussing private
property and self-ownership).
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physically invaded. A strong commitment to autonomy might well lead in this
direction. 5 But this idea seems far too broad as a matter of both settled law
and basic principle. It would draw into question, for example, much of the
activity of the Food and Drug Administration, which is precisely in the
business of deciding what sorts of things may be ingested. Much criminal law
also forbids people from allowing certain invasions of their body; consider
laws forbidding use of addictive substances. The broader standard also appears
to imply an expansive right to sexual autonomy, one that extends far beyond
existing doctrine. We may conclude that the right to prevent physical invasions
has some appeal but has the disadvantage of leaving open many questions,
while the right to decide whether to allow physical invasions lacks both
consistency with precedent and much appeal on the merits.
E. Summary and Alternatives
From these points, several alternatives are available to the Court. First
and simplest, the Court might say that it need not decide whether the right to
physician-assisted suicide qualifies as fundamental for constitutional purposes
and proceed from that point to assess the state's justifications. Second, the
Court might hold that its decisions protect rights vindicated by tradition and
at most involve a right to prevent physical invasions and do not extend to other
kinds of decisional autonomy, even when the body is directly involved. But
this approach has the disadvantage of failing to account for some key cases.
It also fails to explain why so sharp a distinction should be drawn between
removing life-sustaining equipment and administering a drug that hastens
death. As we shall see, a distinction of this kind is reasonable if we focus on
the potential for abuse; but at the level of presumptive rights, it is much harder
to defend. In any case, it seems odd to say that this vexed and controversial
distinction can support the momentous difference between rational basis review
and something like the "compelling interest" standard.
Third, the Court might say more narrowly that there is, under medically
hopeless conditions, a presumptive right to decide whether one will continue
to live. Fourth, and more broadly, the Court might say that the cases recognize
a presumptive right to protection against physical invasion of one's body. It
might add that it is not easy, in principle, to distinguish between the right to
prevent bodily intrusions and the right to physician-assisted suicide, because
that latter right is so obviously central to a person's most fundamental and
apparently self-regarding judgments about the ultimate direction of his life, and
because it is hard to explain why a person should have a constitutionally
protected interest in withdrawing life-saving equipment without also having
85. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL (forthcoming 1997) (defending even broader conception
of autonomy as matter of policy).
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such an interest in terminating his life through "more active" means. ' On this
view, the state must therefore meet a severe burden if it seeks to intrude on
those judgments. Because of the difficulties associated with the various
alternatives, it would probably be best for the Court to take the first route, to
assume that the right to physician-assisted suicide qualifies as fundamental, and
to proceed from there with the issue of justification. This is the course
suggested by Cruzan.s7
III. STATE JUSTIFICATIONS
Suppose that the right to physician-assisted suicide does or is assumed
to qualify as a fundamental interest for constitutional purposes. From this point
it should not be concluded, in mechanical fashion, that any state intrusion is
unacceptable. The Court should say, as it did in Adarand Constructors, Inc. V.
Pena,8 that "strict scrutiny" need not be "'fatal in fact."' 9 The Court
should require a strong demonstration that the interference is reasonable,
without having to be persuaded that it actually agrees with the enacting
legislature. 9° Does the state have a sufficient reason to interfere with that
interest? There are several possible grounds." I outline them here, not to
endorse them, but to suggest what reasonable people might say on behalf of
the ban on physician-assisted suicide. The broadest point is that autonomy,
rightly conceived, does not entail respect for all "choices"; sometimes the right
to choose can diminish autonomy by subjecting people to novel pressures and
influences.
A. Depression, Distress, and Distorted Judgment
People who are in intense pain or emotional distress, and who face a
bleak future, may well be unlikely to think clearly. They may be deeply
depressed or myopic; short-term distress may overwhelm their judgment. We
could easily imagine that people who are or appear to be terminally ill might
be facing the equivalent of duress. In these circumstances, a right to die might
be denied as a way of protecting people against their own distorted judgment.
As I have suggested, the ban on suicide itself is best justified in these terms.
86. See BROCK, supra note 6, at 210-13 (rejecting distinction bct%%ecn passtic and acttc euthanasia)
87. 497 U.S. 261, 277-79 (1990) (assuming right to wtthdrawv treatment qualifies as lbcrty interest
but noting that state may nonetheless have sufficient grounds to interfere with that interest)
88. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
89. Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutzmck. 448 U.S. 448. 519 (1980) (Marshall. J . concurrng))
90. I defend this standard below. See infra Section IV.A.
91. 1 am putting to one side the idea that the state has an interest in protecting life as such In man)
forms, that view is rooted in considerations that are essentially religious in nature and therefore an
illegitimate basis for upholding a law. In nonreligious forms, the idea is hard to understand independently
of the considerations discussed in the text.
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It is intended to signal the gravity of the act and the importance of self-
preservation, with an understanding that people might, under the stress of
extremely difficult times, be tempted to end their lives.
When people's prospects are uncertain, this argument has considerable
force. It appears weaker if we are dealing with genuine category (1) cases-in
which, say, a patient faces six months of deterioration and almost certain death
thereafter. We might conclude that the argument relating to distorted judgment
does not justify state interference in such cases. But in practice, those cases
can be hard to separate from other, quite different cases, and the difficulty of
separating them argues in favor of a general prohibition. In any case, it is a
relevant point in favor of such a prohibition that current medical technology
allows a wide range of means by which to reduce or eliminate intense pain.92
There is a related issue. Sometimes physician-assisted suicide may seem
the easiest way to deal with extreme and understandable distress, but in many
of these cases, there are more productive alternatives, which may lead patients
to deal better with their fears. People who face medically difficult
circumstances and a bleak prognosis may (like anyone else facing a difficult
life event) seek the simplest solution, even though a more difficult approach
may enable them to find some degree of peace or resolution. There are cases
in which physician-assisted suicide appears to have prevented this process; it
seems to have encouraged people to respond to their distress through death
rather than through seeking assistance from professionals and loved ones.93
On this view, a prohibition on physician-assisted suicide is not so different
from the general ban on suicide. It is part of an effort to see death as a part of
life-to encourage distressed people and their families to come to terms with
their fears, including the fear of death itself, in a way that can be productive,
and to ensure that distressed, sick, or dying people are not treated, and do not
treat themselves, as objects to be eliminated from the scene.
B. Protecting the Patient Against External Pressure
A ban on physician-assisted suicide may seem to intrude on the
autonomy of the patient; this is in fact the strongest argument against the ban.
Ironically, however, the ban may have the opposite effect. A vulnerable person
with perhaps a short time to live might be subject to various psychological
pressures from family, certainly if (as is likely) family members are feeling
great distress and also if (as is possible) nontrivial sums of money are at stake.
The closing stages of life can, in short, create conflicts of interest between a
patient and the patient's family members.94 The patient may wish to live as
92. See supra note 18.
93. This is the argument of Herbert Hendin. See HENDIN, supra note II, at 127-34, 155-59.
94. See id. at 114-20. There is a similar concern with the right to abort. Women may be under intense
pressure from boyfriends, parents, or husbands to have an abortion, even when they would prefer not to
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long as possible; family members may believe that this is a situation of great
tragedy, difficulty, and expense, and that it will be much better when it is over.
Here too a right to die may seem the simplest solution while more difficult
approaches would be better for all concerned.
Of course we can imagine situations in which the patient freely agrees
with the family on this point. But it is also possible to foresee situations in
which the patient, having been granted a "right to die," bows to the family's
wishes and hence very much regrets the fact that he has that right.95 If there
is a right to physician-assisted suicide, the social meaning of a refusal to
terminate one's life would be very different from what it now is. Perhaps this
would be an acceptable situation. But since it is, after all, the patient's life that
is on the line, we can imagine reasonable people thinking that the right to die
should be rejected because it actually threatens to decrease patient autonomy
in too many cases.
C. Protecting the Patient Against Pressure from Physicians
Physician-assisted suicide may in practice increase the authority of
physicians rather than the autonomy of patients.96 Suppose that a patient is
confronted with a list of options from a doctor, one of which includes
physician-assisted suicide. In some such cases the patient--confused or
not-might feel actual or implicit pressure to accept the option of death. This
is not because this option is, all things considered, the patient's preferred one,
but because the physician explicitly or implicitly favors it and because, under
the circumstances, the physician has assumed the role of an authority figure.
Once a right is granted, real-world physicians may (consciously or
unconsciously) favor death for any number of reasons, including financial
pressures and the need to allocate scarce time to other, more promising cases.
People who are poor, undereducated, or otherwise disadvantaged may be
especially vulnerable to pressure. Here, too, we have a case in which a ban on
physician-assisted suicide supports rather than undermines autonomy. It is
relevant here that in the Netherlands, the only nation to legalize physician-
assisted suicide, there are many allegations that patient consent is not always
the precondition for medical decisions. 97 One observer claims, "Euthanasia,
do so, and in such cases the right might undermine their autonomy. It is unlikely. however. that a large
percentage of abortions results from these pressures as a matter of fact. If the percentage were in fact large.
the argument for the right to abort would be undermined.
95. Compare the situation of restaurants under Title VII. Many restaurants sought a ban on race
discrimination, on the apparent theory that a legal barrier enabled them to do what they wanted to do and
in that way increased their autonomy. See Lawrence Lessig. The Regulation of Social Aleaning. 62 U. CliI.
L. REV. 943, 965-67 (1995) (discussing how Civil Rights Act of 1964 protected desires of restaurants by
changing "social meaning" of nondiscrimination). Like a right to discriminate, a right to die could decrease
autonomy, by pressuring patients to submit to social norms and familial desires.
96. See HENDIN, supra note II, at 214.
97. See ict at 52-54, 75-84; infra text accompanying notes 101-07.
1997] 1143
HeinOnline  -- 106 Yale L.J. 1143 1996-1997
The Yale Law Journal
advocated and instituted to foster patient autonomy and self-determination, has
actually increased the paternalistic power of the medical profession."98
D. Nonvoluntary Euthanasia
Many critics of the "right to die" believe that there is an easy slippage
from voluntary to nonvoluntary euthanasia. Their argument has two forms. 99
Some people believe that the safeguards designed to ensure a trustworthy
expression of the patient's will cannot be held in place-that in a number of
cases, those safeguards will, as an empirical matter, prove inadequate, and the
patient will be killed despite his wishes. Other people do not stress this
empirical possibility but urge instead that if doctors are put in a position to
honor the suicide requests of (autonomous) patients, the doctors will also
inevitably be making some evaluation of whether those patients' lives will be
worth living. Once doctors begin to make that evaluation, they will, in practice,
be making judgments about the competence of patients and the value of their
lives, and in some number of cases will ultimately terminate lives partly or
mostly on the basis of their own judgments rather than those of their
patients. °°
The experience in the Netherlands is complex, but it is taken by
reasonable people to signal a warning on this front.'0' A comprehensive
survey suggested that of 130,000 people who died each year, 49,000 raised
issues of whether to withdraw life-saving equipment or hasten death, and about
400 cases amounted to assisted suicide.1t 2 There were 9000 annual requests
for euthanasia; of these, voluntary euthanasia-"any action that intentionally
ends the life of someone else, on the request of that person"-was allowed in
2300 cases, or about one-quarter. In 8100 cases, doctors intended to hasten
deaths via pain-killing drugs. 0 3 Some people believe that abuse has been
extensive, in the form of deaths that did not receive adequate consent) °4
Thus, of the 8100 cases involving pain-killing drugs designed to hasten death,
98. HENDIN, supra note 11, at 94.
99. See Keown, supra note 6, at 261-62.
100. See HENDIN, supra note 11, at 50 (arguing that under Dutch system "the patient has no autonomy
because the doctor has decided that the quality of the patient's life is such that it is time for the patient to
die").
101. See, e.g., CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS 104-11, 135 (1991) (claiming that some deaths have not been voluntary); HENDIN, supra
note I1, at 75-84 (discussing involuntary and nonvoluntary deaths); Keown, supra note 6, at 262-63,
271-73 (discussing allegedly large number of involuntary deaths).
102. See Henk A.M.J. ten Have & Jos V.M. Welie, Euthansia: Normal Medical Practice?, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Man-Apr. 1992, at 34 (describing study: Commissie Onderzock Medische Praktijk inzake
euthanasie, Medische Beslissingen rend het Levenseinde [Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life]
(The Hague: S.D.U. Uitgeverij, 1991)); see also Keown, supra note 6, at 267-75 (reporting findings of
study).
103. See Keown, supra note 6, at 271.
104. See GOMEZ, supra note 101, at 104-13, 135; HENDIN, supra note 11, at 75-84.
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5508 involved no explicit request on the patient's part.' One observer
suggests that "the Dutch euthanasia experience lends weighty support to the
slippery slope argument .... Within a decade, the so-called strict safeguards
against the slide have proved signally ineffectual; non-voluntary euthanasia is
now widely practiced and increasingly condoned in the Netherlands."'' 06
Others disagree." 7 The existence of uncertainty on the question suggests that
there is at least a significant possibility of abuse.
E. Systemic Effects, Expressive Values, and the Role of the Physician
Some people undoubtedly support the prohibition on suicide and assisted
suicide because of the expressive value of the prohibition.' That is, a ban
on suicide may be supported as an intrinsic good insofar as it reflects social
attitudes about the sanctity of life.' 9 Perhaps it is inadequate to defend a law
intruding so deeply on patient autonomy on purely expressive grounds. But
less controversially, it might be suggested that the ban has expressive value
insofar as it has salutary effects on social norms-helping to create a culture
in which life is seen with a degree of reverence, and in which the termination
of life, by self or others, is taken to be a tragic event. This point has special
importance insofar as a prohibition on suicide and assisted suicide, even in the
most compelling cases, helps express and fortify norms in favor of dealing
with difficult conditions in more constructive ways. A right to physician-
assisted suicide might be taken to compromise the general social norm against
suicide and assisted suicide, even if, as a technical matter, it applies only in a
restricted and compelling context. We have seen that acts of suicide can be
contagious."0 The state may want to disallow physician-assisted suicides for
fear that a few highly publicized cases may spur a wide range of additional
cases, with harmful effects on norms against suicide in general."'
It is also possible that a right to physician-assisted suicide would have
adverse effects on the norms and role of physicians. Physicians are now faced
with an entrenched norm in favor of the preservation of life. A right to
physician-assisted suicide might have harmful effects on that norm. It is
possible, for example, that such a right would make doctors more willing to
hasten death whether or not this is actually the patient's choice. Such a right
105. See HENDIN, supra note 11, at 76; Keown. supra note 6, at 277
106. Keown, supra note 6, at 289.
107. See EPSTEIN, supra note 85 (manuscript ch. 16. at 12-14) (arguing that stgnificant abuse has not
been demonstrated); POSNER, supra note 1I, at 242 & n.23 (same)
108. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U PA L REv 2021 (1996)
(discussing norms and official -statements"); Cass R. Sunstem. Social Norns and Social Roles, 96 COLL %I
L. REV. 903, 964-65 (1996) (same).
109. But see supra note 91.
110. See ELLIOT ARONSON. THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 63-64 (7th cd 1995) (discusstng copycat suicides).
Phillips, supra note 26, at 341-42 (discussing relation between suicides and knowledge of other sutcides)
111. See ARONSON, supra note I 10, at 63-64.
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may encourage physicians to make personal or cost-benefit judgments that
disserve many patients' interests. The ban on physician-assisted suicide is, on
this view, intended to serve an expressive function, fortifying social norms
associated with the proper role of the physician.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
We have now seen that the state can invoke some powerful justifications
to oppose the right to physician-assisted suicide. In light of these
considerations, how might the Court resolve the question of whether there is
a constitutionally guaranteed right to die? I believe that the Court should reject
the constitutional challenge, partly for institutional reasons connected with the
limited place of the Supreme Court in American government:" 2 When the
issue is very close in light of the underlying issues of fact and value, and when
there is no democratic defect in the underlying political process, the Court
should not strike down reasonable legislative judgments. I consider substantive
due process, equal protection, and (following the lead of Judge Guido
Calabresi in Quill) the form of procedural due process involving the defect
known as "desuetude."
A. Substantive Due Process
1. Narrowly Vindicating the Right
Like the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
might say that there is a fundamental liberty interest in deciding whether to
live or die and that the various state justifications are not sufficient to
overcome that interest. It might support this view with the plausible suggestion
that the various risks can be counteracted through less restrictive alternatives.
A state concerned about those risks might take steps to make sure that the
patient really wants to die by requiring a certain burden of proof, ensuring that
the circumstances meet certain constraints, imposing procedural safeguards of
various kinds, and using the criminal law against doctors who pressure patients
and do not simply follow their wishes. This approach would be reminiscent of
Roe in the sense that it would follow the familiar two-step process of finding
a fundamental right and declaring that the state does not have a "compelling"
interest that it is unable to support with less restrictive means.
This route would not be entirely indefensible. At least if we have a
category (1) or category (2) case-the patient's wishes are clear, the condition
is genuinely hopeless, and the patient is facing physically difficult
circumstances-reasonable people might believe that the state's interests are
112. See infra Subsection IV.A.3.
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not overriding. Perhaps the basic risks could be adequately handled through
procedural safeguards (as I believe is likely true as a matter of policy). Indeed,
it is possible to think that such a route would be stronger than that in several
of the privacy cases, including Roe itself. Here the individual interest may be
at least as insistent and the countervailing interests might seem weaker insofar
as the individual in question has extremely poor life prospects. There is no
direct argument, as there is in the abortion context, about preventing harm to
third parties. The Court has almost never said that a state can intrude on a
right that qualifies as fundamental, and unlike the procedural rules upheld in
Cruzan, the barrier to physician-assisted suicide is a total ban.
But vindication of the right would not, all things considered, be a good
resolution. The privacy cases are actually far narrower than this two-step
process suggests, and the Court might reasonably seek to cabin those cases by
taking account of their distinctive features. Those features very much involve
problems with democratic deliberation. First, equal protection
dimensions-themselves calling up democratic concerns connected with
political inequality-were present in many of these cases. Roe was in
important part a case of gender equality, as then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg
suggested in 1985113 and as the Court has since explicitly acknowledged."'
If that decision is to be made acceptable, it must be partly because of the
connection between sex equality and the abortion right.' 5 Nor was this only
true of Roe. In privacy cases involving a right of use or access to
contraceptives," 6 there was at least a tacit equal protection dimension as
well, for women were particularly at risk in the event of an unwanted
pregnancy. It does not require much imagination to see this point. When
discrimination of this kind is involved, the interest in democratic deliberation
legitimately calls for a larger judicial role so as to counteract predictable
problems with ordinary majoritarian processes.
Second, as Alexander Bickel suggested long ago, the early cases raised
questions of procedural due process, for they involved laws that were
practically unenforced and unenforceable." '7 Thus the ban on the use of
113. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equali in Relation to Roe v Wade.
63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 385-86 (1985) (suggesting that Roe should have been decided more narrowly and
as equality case).
114. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 896-98 (1992) (plurality opinion) (referrng to
interest in sex equality); id. at 918-19 (Stevens, J., concumng in part and dissenting in part) (same); ad.
at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part. concurmng in the judgment in pan, and dissenting in pan) (same)
115. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 270-85; Reva Siegel. Reasoning from the Body- A Histoncal
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN%. L REv 261. 380 (1992);
David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration, and Moral Uncertauntn. 1992 SUP CT REv. I. 18-22. Kenneth
L. Karst, Book Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1028. 1036-37 (1976) (noting relevance of equahty concerns
to abortion question).
116. See Carey v. Population Servs. lnt'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977): Eisenstadt v Baird. 405 US. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
117. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCiH 148-56 (2d c&d 1986) (discussing
concept of desuetude).
1997] 1147
HeinOnline  -- 106 Yale L.J. 1147 1996-1997
The Yale Law Journal
contraceptives within marriage was not a simple invasion of privacy; it
involved a statute enacted long ago, not plausibly representing the considered
judgments of the relevant electorate, and enforced only in a selective and
discriminatory manner."8 In this sense, the ban presented a case of
desuetude." 9 The other privacy cases did not vindicate a broad right to
control one's body. They suggested more narrowly that if a state is going to
regulate sexual activity, it must do so directly and not through the indirect, at
best modestly effective means of making pregnancy the price of that activity.
We may thus conclude that the privacy cases did not involve a simple
identification of a fundamental right and a judgment that the state lacked
sufficient justification to intrude. There were important issues relating to
procedural due process and equal protection as well. And these issues suggest
that there were problems in the system of democratic deliberation that
contributed to the outcomes in the relevant cases. Thus the Court did not
announce a broad right to sexual autonomy. It said more narrowly that any
intrusion on that right must be direct, nondiscriminatory, and supported by
actual public judgments, rather than indirect, discriminatory, and reflecting no
actual judgment from the democratic public.
Along these dimensions, the right to physician-assisted suicide is quite
different. In many cases, that right has been considered very recently in the
relevant states. 120 Moreover, there is no serious equal protection dimension
in these cases.' 2' No politically vulnerable group is at risk, at least not in any
constitutionally pertinent sense. It does make sense to assume or say that the
decision whether to live in category (1) and (2) cases implicates a fundamental
interest for constitutional purposes. But the state has very strong reasons to
intrude on that interest. The closest analogy may be to third-trimester
abortions, where the Court did not deny that women retain a fundamental
interest, but found the state's justification sufficient to support intrusion on that
interest, even in the context of a near-total prohibition. 22 It is perfectly
reasonable for citizens, in their capacity as voters, to conclude that state law
should allow a right to physician-assisted suicide. But a decision by the Court,
foreclosing diverse solutions in diverse states, would intrude into ongoing
118. See id.; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 326-28 (1992) (discussing role of
Catholic Church in preventing statutory change).
119. See infra note 152 and accompanying text. See generally BICKEL, supra note 117, at 148-56.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 162--64.
121. Perhaps it might be thought that politically weak groups are most vulnerable in a system lacking
a formal right to physician-assisted suicide; many (wealthy, well-educated) people may have something like
that right even in a system in which the right is not formally recognized. But politically weak people would
also be at special risk in a system recognizing such a right; the risks of abuse might well operate most
strongly against members of disadvantaged groups. Hence the interest in political equality does not seem
to argue in any particular direction. Note in this regard that while a slight majority of whites favor
physician-assisted suicide, African Americans oppose it by more than two to one. See HENDIN, supra note
11, at 180.
122. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
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deliberative processes in circumstances in which reasonable people may differ.
This is so especially insofar as the relevant judgments depend on factual issues
not well-suited for judicial judgment.
2. Rejecting the Due Process Claim
The Court might simply uphold the relevant laws. It might hold that there
is no fundamental interest, for reasons discussed above. Far more promisingly,
it might say that even if there is a fundamental interest, the state has sufficient
reason to interfere with the choice. There is a great deal to be said on behalf
of this conclusion. The distinction between withdrawing treatment and active
euthanasia may not be supportable at the level of first principles; but it reflects
widely held intuitions and, more fundamentally, the state's justifications for
rejecting a right to physician-assisted suicide are stronger at least in
degree.12 3 Thus the Court might say that the risks of abuse and
misapplication are not so serious in the case of withdrawal of treatment, but
that a state could reasonably decide that those risks are decisive against
physician-assisted suicide.
Moreover, recognition of the importance of the state's countervailing
interests would free up state legislatures to do as they wish with a problem that
is very much on the public agenda. As we have seen, the state does have
powerful interests with which to counterpose the claim from decisional
autonomy. 24 Notably, those interests are more powerful than in any of the
privacy cases vindicating the underlying right. In Roe, the state's
justification-protection of fetal life-seemed (and seems) to many quite
strong; but at least there is a serious question whether, on secular grounds,
fetal life deserves the same respect and concern as human life post-viability.
By contrast, the potential abuses introduced by any right to physician-assisted
suicide have considerable weight whatever one's convictions about
foundational issues. The Court is not in a good position to know whether the
likely risks are serious and whether they can be reduced sufficiently through
less restrictive means. For this reason, the question is admirably well-suited to
a federal system that can conduct a range of experiments.
3. Institutional Notes
It should be clear that the argument I am making depends on the
controversial suggestion that when there is no palpable defect in the system of
123. See infra text accompanying notes 143-45.
124. A suggestion to this effect is made by a defender of the right to acti'c cuthanasia See BROCK.
supra note 6, at 172 ("Different persons can reasonably reach different conclusions ')
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democratic deliberation,1 5 courts should respect very reasonable legislative
judgments even if a "fundamental interest" is at stake. 26 This view depends
on two assumptions. The first is that judicial judgments about how to balance
the relevant interests, especially in light of factual and predictive uncertainties,
are not always reliable. Judges are aware of this point and they devise
doctrines accordingly. Of course, judges have certain advantages by virtue of
their insulation and their ability, perhaps, to be especially careful with respect
to underlying issues of both fact and political morality. But with respect to
issues of both fact and value, judicial insulation can be a disadvantage too; it
can make it harder for courts to obtain relevant information, and it can make
it less legitimate for judges to choose what to do in the face of factual
uncertainty. Judicial insulation suggests that courts should not be too sure that
they are right, 127 in the sense that they should be reluctant to overturn a
legislative judgment when the balance is quite close and when there is no
problem in democratic deliberation.1
21
The second assumption is that even if judges are right, they should be
aware that their (by hypothesis correct) moral judgments, once announced, may
not receive immediate social vindication and may instead produce something
very different from what they intended. 29 This is because judicial judgments
may truncate ongoing processes of democratic deliberation, and by so doing,
may prove futile or even counterproductive. In the context of abortion, this is
a plausible view, for the nation may well have been moving reasonably
amicably toward a solution not far from Roe and reflecting deliberative
125. I am referring here to the general view of constitutional interpretation set out in ELY, supra note
4; see also JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 266 (William Rehg trans., Polity Press 1996)
(1992) (arguing against judicial paternalism); SUNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 123-61 (embracing same general
view). On this view, a democratic problem exists if a right central to democracy is at issue (for example,
the right to free political speech) or if a group is being fenced out of political processes through formal
exclusions or, more controversially, prejudice or "animus." See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1627
(1996) (striking down state constitutional amendment partly because it reflects "animus").
It might be thought that there is such a defect in light of the fact that religious groups can block
change for religious reasons, and perhaps this accounts for current practice in some states. The short answer
is that this is not the sort of defect that would justify a more aggressive judicial role. Religious groups of
course are entitled to participate in democratic processes, and even if there are constraints on the kinds of
arguments that they are entitled to make, the arguments typically invoked against physician-assisted suicide
do not run afoul of those constraints. The case is different from Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), where a well-organized religious minority, invoking a purely religious argument, was able to block
a repeal that was very generally favored of a prohibition that was never directly enforced through the
criminal law. See POSNER, supra note 118, at 324-28.
126. This is not to say that courts should defer to any minimally plausible legislative judgment; the
critical fact here is that fully reasonable people might decide this issue either way, even though the Court
might find one view more reasonable than the other as a matter of policy.
127. Cf LEARNED HAND, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard
ed., 3d ed. enlarged 1960) (suggesting that spirit of liberty is spirit which "is not too sure that it is right").
128. Accord EPSTEIN, supra note 85 (manuscript ch. 17, at 2). Professor Epstein's view is notable
insofar as he is a strong defender of the right to physician-assisted suicide as a matter of policy, see id.
(manuscript ch. 16, at 2-3), and insofar as he is not reluctant to urge a strong judicial role in other areas,
see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985) (arguing for aggressive protection of property rights).
129. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 175-201 (1991) (discussing limits of courts
in producing social reform and complex effects of Roe v. Wade).
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compromises in various states. 3 ' Currently, the same may well be true with
respect to physician-assisted suicide (or, to take an issue that is in some ways
similar, the right to same-sex marriage). 131 In these circumstances, a
constitutional ruling may embroil the Court in decades of political conflict.
This consideration should not be decisive; if the argument for the constitutional
right were compelling, as in for example Brown v. Board of Education,32
a majority or minority that rejects the right should not be allowed to exercise
any kind of heckler's veto. In Brown, the existence of political inequality and
racial animus suggested that possible disagreement among apparently
reasonable people should not be decisive in court. But where there is no such
inequality and the issue is otherwise very close, institutional considerations of
this kind are relevant. 133 They suggest that if democratic processes are not
malfunctioning, judges should be cautious about invoking their own moral
judgments partly because of the risk of producing unfortunate and unintended
consequences.
This is not the occasion to attempt a full account of the appropriate
occasions for exercising judicial power under the rubric of "substantive due
process." It should be clear from what I have said thus far that most past
substantive due process cases had some other element involving a democratic
failure of some kind: excessive role for religious convictions in the public
sphere, insufficient connection with considered public judgments, or problems
of inequality and prejudice. Certainly we could imagine cases calling for
substantive due process even without these elements. Suppose, for example,
that government imposed a general "one family, one child" policy, or required
people to have abortions, or said that randomly chosen people must give their
kidneys to those who need them. The fact that these cases are so bizarrely
unlikely suggests that the occasions for "pure" substantive due process will be
rare indeed. Ordinarily, political safeguards are sufficient against such gross
abuses, and if they are not sufficient, circumstances (underlying facts and
values) are likely to be so entirely different from our own that our present
(outraged, uncomprehending) view of them does not yield a strong defense of
substantive due process. For present purposes the central point is that while
there may be some cases in which states have no sufficiently powerful grounds
130. Cf id. at 182-84 (discussing growing popular support for repeal of abortion laws pnor to Roe).
But see DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 616-17 (1994) (contending that states would not
have moved in direction set by Roe). Whether or not Roe is a good example. the point certainly holds in
general.
131. This right is vigorously urged in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGF. JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE 123-82 (1996), which claims that the Constitution forbids laws banning same-sex mamage.
132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. Cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1220-28 (1978) (discussing rights that courts, for institutional reasons,
underenforce).
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for interfering with what is properly characterized as a fundamental interest,
the right to physician-assisted suicide is not such a case.
In the context at hand, there is a further point. As least as much as Roe
itself, a decision on behalf of a right to physician-assisted suicide would put
the Court in the exceedingly difficult business of specifying appropriate
procedures and boundary lines. It is inevitable that a judicially recognized right
would have to be accompanied by guarantees designed to ensure that the
patient genuinely wants to die. States that are skeptical of the underlying right
would predictably devise correspondingly elaborate procedures, and hence the
Court would be in the business of distinguishing between justified and
unjustified measures designed to produce certainty about the patient's wishes.
If a ban on suicide is permissible, the Court would have to make fine
distinctions between those cases in which physician-assisted suicide is a
constitutional right and those in which it is not. These considerations ought not
to be decisive if the case for a constitutional guarantee is otherwise
compelling. But they suggest that any such guarantee would produce not one
judgment but a long line of judgments, not well-suited to judicial competence.




In Eisenstadt v. Baird,34 the Court struck down as irrational a law
forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people. The Court
said that it was irrational to prohibit the distribution of contraceptives among
unmarried people if such distribution was not prohibited to married people. 35
Many questions might be raised about the Court's reasoning; the state's
decision was hardly irrational in the technical sense. But Eisenstadt can be
understood as a rather cautious and modest ruling, one that vindicates a claim
that the Court thought convincing without going so far as to announce a
general "substantive due process" right to purchase contraceptives.
Perhaps the Court might attempt to do something like this and seek a
more modest approach via the generality-requiring commands of the Equal
Protection Clause. The Second Circuit attempted a route of just this sort in
Quill v. Vacco.136 The court noticed that New York allowed patients to order
the removal of life support systems, but did not otherwise allow patients to
take action to terminate their lives. This inequality, the court said, violated the
134. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
135. See id. at 454-55.
136. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
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Equal Protection Clause because it was "not rationally related to any legitimate
state interest."'37 On this view, there is no sufficiently good reason to allow
people to terminate their lives in one way while banning them from doing so
in another way. Under the decision of the court of appeals, New York might
be able to ban both physician-assisted suicide and removal of life support
systems (though the latter step would raise substantive due process questions
under Cruzan), but it may not discriminate.
The equal protection/rationality approach has an advantage of
comparative modesty; it also has a plausible antecedent in Eisenstadt. But the
argument is nonetheless weak. Longstanding traditions, and many reasonable
people, have distinguished between killing and letting die. 3 This distinction
finds a particular instantiation in the idea that people should be allowed to
remove life-saving equipment but not to kill themselves. Certainly the
action/omission distinction raises many puzzles, and it is far from clear that the
distinction makes ultimate sense in this context,139 but a holding that it is
"irrational" runs afoul of both ordinary law and ordinary intuitions. If the
distinction in this context is unconstitutional because it is irrational, it is
unconstitutional in many other contexts as well. Consider, for example,
criminal law's distinction between killing and letting die,' ' tort law's
absence of liability for bad samaritans, 1 ' and indeed due process law's own
distinction between government actions and omissions.'- 2
There is also theoretical support for the distinction. Here are some
possible grounds. Without endorsing the distinction for all purposes, we can
say that someone who jumps off a building expresses contempt for his own
life, whereas someone who disconnects life-saving equipment, and allows
nature to take its course, expresses no such contempt. The attitude expressed
by what are conventionally labelled "acts" may well be different from the
attitude expressed by what are conventionally labelled "omissions." Similarly,
it might seem that a doctor who assists in suicide is different from a doctor
who withdraws life-saving equipment, because of the different attitudes
expressed by the two acts. In any case, the right to remove life support might
be rooted in a desire to allow people to prevent the government from
restraining and invading their bodies against their will. The right to physician-
assisted suicide is at least plausibly different on this score. I do not mean to
137. Id. at 731.
138. For a philosophical discussion of this distinction. see, for example. BROCK. supra notc 6. at
202-13.
139. See id.
140. Murder is, of course, prohibited in various forms, but states do not impos criminal penaltcs on
the general failure to assist people who will die without help.
141. See WILLIANi L. PROSSER. HANDBOOK OF TiE LAW OF ToRTs § 56, at 338-43 (4th ed. 1971).
142. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Scrvs., 489 U.S. 189. 195-203 (1989)
(holding that there is no affirmative right to action by state).
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endorse these points as a matter of basic principle. But if rationality review is
genuinely at work, a state could allow people to terminate life support while
disallowing them from asking doctors to administer life-terminating drugs.
In my view, the more important points are empirical and pragmatic. It is
reasonable to think that the risks of abuse are far greater in cases of physician-
assisted suicide than in cases of withdrawal of life support. The latter set of
cases is far easier to cabin; the former set raises in far more imaginable
contexts the various difficulties discussed in Part I. A central reason is that
the withdrawal of life-saving equipment is as a general rule far less likely to
be unjustifiable-far less likely to reflect an irrational judgment by a
competent patient-than is resort to assisted suicide. In the ordinary case, the
withdrawal of life-saving equipment will involve a life that a patient
reasonably and with adequate information wants to terminate; the act of
assisted suicide far more commonly can involve a form of involuntary
euthanasia, short-run distortions in judgment, or familial or physician pressure.
For this reason, the distinction is an imperfect but fully reasonable proxy for
(costly, imperfect) case-by-case inquiries into the reasonableness of the
grounds for choosing death in particular instances. 4
3
This is not to deny that withdrawal of life support raises risks of abuse
as well. We can certainly imagine instances in which very dependent patients
feel pressured, by family or doctors, to misstate their true wishes in the face
of exceptionally expensive medical treatments. But at least some safeguard
against widespread abuse comes from the very possibility that the withdrawal
would produce death; these are relatively rare cases, mostly involving terrible
and terminal illnesses, and allowing the withdrawal of treatment does not risk
the sheer number of conceivable instances in which a right to physician-
assisted suicide would produce nonautonomous or involuntary deaths, or deaths
that more nearly resemble ordinary suicide. The withdrawal of treatment
produces death only if the patient suffers from a fatal illness, whereas the right
to physician-assisted suicide may well, in either theory or practice, apply far
more broadly even if we attempt to restrict its domain.'" It is for this reason
that this distinction is fully plausible as a way of attempting to protect patient
autonomy and to combat risks of abuse. 45 So long as rationality review is
genuinely at work, the equal protection challenge is unconvincing.
143. See David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 335 NEW ENO. J. MED.
663, 665 (1996).
144. See Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr.
1992, at 52, 53-55.
145. See HENDIN, supra note 11, at 47-95. Recall that my suggestion is that the distinction is
sufficiently plausible for constitutional purposes; the policy issue is different. See supra text accompanying
notes 11-13; see also Orentlicher, supra note 143, at 665-66 (arguing that permitting assisted suicide in
"limited" cases will bring law closer to society's moral values).
1154 [Vol. 106: 1123
HeinOnline  -- 106 Yale L.J. 1154 1996-1997
Right to Die
2. Equal Protection "Fundamental Rights"
The equal protection argument might be rooted in the "fundamental
rights" branch of equal protection doctrine. In a number of cases, the Court has
said that it will look skeptically at classifications that involve fundamental
rights. It might be concluded that there is a fundamental interest here and that
any discrimination with respect to that interest must be given a compelling
justification. The distinction between refusing treatment and physician-assisted
suicide is rational, to be sure, but perhaps it does not have a compelling
argument on its behalf. Thus understood, the case would be like Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson146 and Zablocki v. Redhail,"' involving
sterilization and marriage, respectively, and using the fundamental rights
branch of equal protection doctrine.
But this branch of the doctrine raises many puzzles. At least at first
glance, the Equal Protection Clause creates a right to nondiscrimination; it does
not create any independent "fundamental rights." The key equal protection
"fundamental rights" cases involve voting,148 and thus should be seen as part
of democracy-reinforcing judicial review, not as a kind of junior-varsity
substantive due process. It remains to be explained why Skinner and Zablocki
are treated as equal protection rather than due process cases. If they are to be
so treated, it is because they involve issues of discrimination as well as issues
of "fundamental rights." Skinner is probably best understood as a case in
which criminals of a certain social class were peculiarly subjected to the
punishment of sterilization; Zablocki is best understood as a case informed and
influenced by the fact that the relevant law prohibited poor people from
marrying. Thus both cases can be seen as part of the general line of cases
increasing judicial scrutiny where politically weak groups are at risk. The right
to physician-assisted suicide does not raise problems of this sort.
Nor is it clear what might be gained by holding some rights to be
fundamental for equal protection purposes but not for purposes of substantive
due process. Perhaps the idea is that the fundamental rights branch of equal
protection doctrine is less intrusive than substantive due process because it
leaves states more room to maneuver by permitting them to invade the relevant
right so long as they do so on a nondiscriminatory basis. This is not entirely
implausible; for purposes of physician-assisted suicide, the analysis in Skinner
would be less intrusive than a rerun of Roe. But from the analytic point of
view, it is very untidy. The state has fully reasonable grounds for allowing
withdrawal of life-saving equipment while fearing the risks of abuse that might
146. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating law requiring sterilization of certain cnminals).
147. 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating law forbidding people to marry unless they have met their
support obligations).
148. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (articulating one person, one vote principle).
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follow from a right to physician-assisted suicide. If the substantive due process
argument is not convincing, the equal protection argument is unconvincing as
well.
C. Desuetude
The Court might strike down such laws unless they are a product of
recent legislative deliberation on the particular issues raised by physician-
assisted suicide. This is the solution favored by Judge Calabresi in his
intriguing if somewhat adventurous concurring opinion in Quill. 49 Judge
Calabresi's solution identifies an important and salutary theme in constitutional
law, one that raises complex issues and deserves considerable attention. A
large advantage of Judge Calabresi's approach is institutional. It ensures that
interferences with important forms of liberty will not be based on law that
lacks current political support; in that way, the approach is democracy-
supporting. Moreover, it does not preempt but instead catalyzes democratic
processes, and in that sense reflects the courts' appropriate caution in dealing
with complex ethical and factual issues. The principal problem with Judge
Calabresi's approach is that the case of physician-assisted suicide does not
easily fit the case of desuetude, for the "right to die" has received ample recent
consideration in most of the relevant states. I conclude that the idea of
desuetude is extremely important and valuable, and deserves a more prominent
and explicit place in constitutional law, but that it ought not to be used to call
for new legislation in Washington or New York.
1. The General Idea
The basic argument is simple. Suppose that the relevant laws-banning
people from helping in the commission of suicide-were written long ago, and
suppose too that they were not specifically addressed to the problem of
physician-assisted suicide. Indeed, that problem is a recent one, made available
by new technologies and practices. In light of the novelty of the relevant
practice, and (let us assume) the lack of legislative attention to that practice,
we could imagine a state court ruling that state law bans on assisting suicide
do not even cover physician-assisted suicide, on the ground that criminal
statutes should be construed narrowly and not applied to a case that is so far
afield from the understandings of the enacting legislature.'50 If a state court
149. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring in the result).
150. Cf. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-59 (1980) (plurality
opinion of Stevens, J.) (construing statute against ordinary language so as to avoid perceived unintended
outcome); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (interpreting statute
contrary to its plain meaning so as not to reach outcome likely disfavored by enacting legislature).
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has not so held, a federal court, faced with a due process challenge, might say
something like this:
We do not hold that a state may never forbid physician-assisted
suicide. But if a state is going to forbid a decision of this kind, it
must demonstrate that it has focused with some particularity on the
problem and concluded that its rationale is weighty enough to override
the individual's decision. An old statute banning assistance in suicide,
enacted long ago in a time of different values and facts, is not
sufficient.
This may seem an exotic argument. But it has roots in the old notion of
"desuetude," in accordance with which citizens may not be prosecuted under
laws that were enacted long ago, are regularly violated in practice, may not
connect with existing public convictions, and are enforced only on a sporadic
and highly selective basis.' 5 ' The notion of desuetude does not have explicit
support in the decisions of the Supreme Court. But it makes a good deal of
constitutional sense. Notably, it is a form of procedural rather than substantive
due process; the basic concerns are that there has been no focused legislative
deliberation about the particular matter at hand and that rule of law principles
are being violated in the enforcement process. A ruling of this kind is far less
intrusive than one based on ordinary substantive due process principles, for it
leaves open the possibility that a current legislature might resolve the matter
as it chooses. And the principle does have antecedents. Many commentators
have suggested that it provides a simpler and more compelling basis for
Griswold v. Connecticut,'52 and Justice White's opinion in Griswold can be
understood to point to concerns of this sort.
Other judge-made doctrines have, without using the name, pointed to
desuetude-related concerns. In some cases, for example, the Court will uphold
a statute only on the basis of a rationale actually at work in the process leading
to its enactment. A merely hypothetical purpose is not enough. This was a
central part of the Court's reasoning in United Stares i Virginia,'5 where
the Court invalidated a same-sex program at the Virginia Military Institute on
the ground that no legislature had in fact adopted single-sex education as a
151. See BICKEL, supra note 117, at 148-56.
152. 381 U.S. 479 (1965): see Guido Calabresi. Foreuord Antidscrmntiaton gind Conrtaugwnal
Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores). 105 HARV L REV 80. 122 n 136 (1991)
153. 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2277-79 (1996) (striking down law in part on ground that there %%a5 no actual
purpose of promoting educational diversity and equal opporunity). see also Thompson % Oklahoma. 487
U.S. 815, 857-58 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (voting to stike dosn la%% imposing death penalty sith
no minimum age provision on grounds that statute did not reflect actual and recent legislatie judgments
in light of subsequent statute allowing minors to be dealt with as adults in sonic cases. Califano v
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.9 (1977) (Stevens. J.. concurrng) ("Perhaps an actual, considered legislatie
choice would be sufficient to allow this statute to be upheld. but that is a question I %ould reserse until
such a choice has been made.").
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way of promoting equality of opportunity and educational diversity.' 54 The
Court left open the possibility that a legislature that actually operated with this
purpose might be proceeding constitutionally. We can even understand Virginia
as a case of desuetude, for the Court treated the relevant statute as embodying
an obsolete judgment, one that had not been reaffirmed by a recent legislature
operating on the basis of constitutionally legitimate principles. In cases of this
kind, the Court leaves open the possibility that a statute calling for same-sex
schooling, enacted on the basis of a legitimate and sufficiently weighty
rationale, will in fact be upheld.
The Court also construes ambiguous statutes so as to avoid raising
serious constitutional doubts. 55 This idea has roots in the nondelegation
doctrine; indeed, it can be seen as a narrow and more targeted version of the
nondelegation doctrine, designed to say that the national legislature (rather than
the bureaucracy) must focus specifically on the problem at hand. There is a
close link with the doctrine of desuetude insofar as both doctrines are designed
to ensure that the coercive power of law will be brought to bear on citizens
only on the basis of a specific and focused legislative judgment to this effect.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in the same basic concern. 56
When the Court strikes down a statute as unacceptably vague, it leaves open
the possibility that a more specific version of the legislative
judgment-regulating speech or conduct-may be valid. A void-for-vagueness
holding leaves that question undecided; it demands a focused legislative
determination. It is notable in this regard that Roe itself was originally
conceived as a void-for-vagueness case, 57 a holding that would have been
far more cautious and modest than the opinion that emerged.
In its intriguing decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,' the Court
similarly held that if aliens are going to be deprived of all federal employment,
it must be because of a judgment from Congress or the President, not the Civil
Service Commission. The Court said that the Due Process Clause renders
invalid a wholesale deprivation of employment unless a constitutionally
specified official has decided that such a drastic step is desirable.' 59 The
154. 116 S. Ct. at 2265.
155. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (holding NLRB without
jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools under the National Labor Relations Act so as to avoid
First Amendment difficulties); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (construing statute so as to avoid
constitutional doubts).
156. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (striking down vagrancy
law for vagueness). A similar idea underlies the development of death penalty doctrine. In Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice White and Justice Stewart did not hold that death penalties were
unconstitutional per se, but only that the death penalty had to be administered nonarbitrarily. See id. at
306-14 (White and Stewart, JJ., concurring). Once the public reaffirmed its commitment to capital
punishment under more specific criteria after this form of "constitutional remand," the Court retreated. See
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976).
157. See GARROW, supra note 130, at 547-49.
158. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
159. See id. at 116.
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problem with the relevant regulation was that it faced a "legitimacy deficit"
because it had not been embraced by someone with adequate political
accountability."' °
All of these cases have close connections with the notion of desuetude.
They suggest that a less intrusive alternative to a substantive due process
holding is a conclusion that the state must show sufficient grounds, in actual
democratic judgments, for an intrusion on certain interests and rights.
2. Problems
As I have noted, an idea of this kind is not a version of substantive due
process; it suggests instead that there is a procedural defect in the laws at
hand. What would be wrong with an opinion of this sort? There is an obvious
slippery slope problem. Many statutes now in operation were enacted long ago,
when facts and values were different; are all such statutes unconstitutional?
Surely they are not, and their longstanding character may well testify to their
wisdom and good sense, not to their doubtful legitimacy. A constitutional
doctrine would be absurd if it declared all old enactments void. The answer
would have to be that the prohibition against desuetude applies not only when
a law is very old, but also when (a) a liberty interest is at stake; (b) the
rationale brought forward in the law's defense did not play any kind of role
in the enacting legislature; (c) there is a demonstrated problem of sporadic and
perhaps discriminatory enforcement; and (d) the relevant rationale, if supported
by adequate facts and an actual legislative judgment, may well be sufficient to
justify the intrusion on the liberty interest.
But there is another objection. An approach based on desuetude puts
courts in the business of setting the legislative agenda. Any legislature has a
great deal to do, and its failure to alter a law involving assisted suicide may
well not signify indifference or neglect, but something like a considered
judgment that the status quo is acceptable. In fact, this is a reasonable view
about New York itself in Quill v. Vacco.16' And if the legislature has
recently considered the problem and failed to do anything new, the doctrine of
desuetude probably should not apply. But for cases that involve an unusually
strong liberty interest and a justification that is post hoc and of questionable
relevance to any actual legislative decision, a ruling founded on desuetude
makes a great deal of sense as a less restrictive alternative to an equal
protection or due process ruling. It should be seen as an effort to create a more
deliberative democracy, one in which certain interests can be compromised
only on the basis of a recent deliberative judgment, not as a kind of accident.
160. See id.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 163-64.
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3. Desuetude Misapplied?
An idea of this kind provides the strongest support for Griswold itself,
and, as we have seen, it is far from entirely foreign to constitutional law. But
this rationale could not be used if the statute forbidding physician-assisted
suicide were the product of recent and sustained legislative deliberation. Here
we find the simplest response to the argument from desuetude: These are not
at all cases in which states have been inattentive to the underlying issues of
fact and policy. On the contrary, the issue of physician-assisted suicide has
received a great deal of attention. In the state of Washington, the relevant law
was enacted in 1992.162 In New York, there has been no recent legislative
enactment forbidding physician-assisted suicide, but the issue has been
receiving intense consideration at the highest levels of state government. Thus
a new enactment specified the conditions for withdrawal of life-saving
equipment as recently as 1990,63 and in 1994, a highly visible Task Force
issued a report recommending that things be left as they were.1
64
Judge Calabresi may be suggesting that intense consideration is not
enough and that a state must not only consider a statute that raises problems
of desuetude but also reenact it. t65 The apparent thought is that inertia may
reflect something other than approval, and that in any case, an intense minority
may be able to block consideration, in the sense of an actual vote, without
being able to block enactment once a vote occurs. In some ways this is an
attractive view; it suggests a possible distinction between New York and
Washington. But if there is good evidence that a state government has actively
and intensely considered an issue, as New York has, it seems strained to say
that the Due Process Clause requires actual reenactment. The question is
whether it would really make sense to invalidate the New York ban while
upholding the ban in Washington, when the distinction seems relatively thin
in light of the large volume of public attention given to the issue in both states.
Nor is this a case like Griswold, in which a politically intense minority was
able to block legislative change that was generally desired. 66 With respect
to physician-assisted suicide, politically intense minorities are on all sides of
the question, and no particular group faces or creates a systematic barrier to
well-functioning democratic deliberation.
I conclude, then, that the general idea of desuetude serves important
constitutional values and has significant advantages over the substantive due
162. See Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
163. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 728 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
164. See id. at 734-35.
165. See id. at 735 ("inertia will not do"); accord BICKEL, supra note 117, at 148 (claiming that failure
to repeal statute is not necessarily sufficient to rebut challenge on grounds of desuetude).
166. See POSNER, supra note 118, at 326-28 (defending Griswold and arguing that statute persisted
only because of political power of Catholic Church).
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process route; that we could imagine cases involving physician-assisted suicide
that would provide a good arena for invoking that idea; but that the issue has
been under intense discussion in many states and that Washington and New
York have had intense recent deliberations. If the Court is to accept a version
of Judge Calabresi's proposal-and I believe that it ultimately should-it
should do so in a simpler and more compelling setting.
D. Death and Abortion: A Note
At several points I have compared the right to physician-assisted suicide
with the right to have an abortion, and it will now be useful to bring together
some strands of the comparison, since Roe looms so clearly in the background
of the discussion of a constitutional right to die. A central distinction is that
Roe is best understood as largely a case about sex equality. It was not simply
a due process case, as the Court has come to recognize; it depended centrally
on the fact that restrictions on the right to abort are a form of discrimination
against women and closely associated with traditional and no longer legitimate
ideas about women's appropriate role.167 The right to die does not have this
equal protection element.
61
Along the dimension of justification, there is also a difference between
Roe and the right to physician-assisted suicide. The principal justification in
Roe rested on the perceived importance of protecting the fetus. It is possible
to think that fetuses are not people and that a commitment to the overriding
importance of their survival depends on sectarian claims. Without defending
this controversial view, we can see that a claim of this general sort underlies
Roe itself. By contrast, the state's justifications for interfering with the right
to physician-assisted suicide are unquestionably legitimate and largely
empirical in nature. To the extent that the state is saying that it fears risks of
abuse, it is able to offer a quasi-predictive defense of the sort that was
unavailable in Roe.
It also follows from what I have said thus far that the Court should be
very cautious about duplicating the experience of Roe and that it is by no
means clear that the broad holding of Roe was right at the time. At the very
least, it is by no means clear that the Court was correct to have created so
broad a right in its first confrontation with the abortion issue. The Court would
have done much better to have proceeded narrowly and incrementally, and to
167. For a recent discussion, see United States v. Virginia. 116 S. Ct. 2264. 2274-76 (1996). in which
the Court invalidated same-sex education at Virginia Military Institute. AVISHAI MARGALIT. TttE DECENTI
Soct ry (1996), is, in my view, a relevant discussion of the phenomenon of "humiliation- via state
channels.
168. See supra Section IV.B.
11611997]
HeinOnline  -- 106 Yale L.J. 1161 1996-1997
The Yale Law Journal
have engaged in a form of dialogue with the political process. 69 It would
have done much better because it would not have caused so much destructive
and unnecessary social upheaval, because it probably would have produced a
range of creative compromises well-adapted to a federal system, and because
a more cautious approach would not deeply have compromised the underlying
right, as that right is best conceived. The Roe experience is not one that the
Court should duplicate, at least when the Court's underlying judgment is
subject to reasonable dispute and when there is no particular reason to distrust
political processes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Essay I have made three claims. First, I have suggested that courts
should be reluctant to invalidate legislation under the Due Process Clause in
its "substantive" dimension when there is no defect in the system of
democratic deliberation and when reasonable people might decide the
underlying questions of value and fact either way. I have also suggested that
this idea plays a large and underappreciated role in existing law. The key
privacy cases, though decided as a matter of substantive due process, had
important dimensions of desuetude and equal protection. The equal protection
"fundamental rights" cases had large dimensions of democracy-reinforcement,
involving as they did political rights or groups at particular risk in democratic
processes.
Second, I have argued that when conditions are, or appear to be,
medically hopeless, the individual's interest in physician-assisted suicide
should probably qualify as one on which the state may intrude only with
special justification. But-and this is the third claim-I have also suggested
that this principle should not be understood to invalidate state efforts to prevent
people from taking their own lives on their own or with the assistance of
others. It is not easy to decide how states should handle the forms of distress
that produce requests for physician-assisted suicide; much of that distress
might be alleviated by helping patients and families come to terms with the
fact of death. Physician-assisted suicide creates palpable risks of abuse, and the
weight to be given to these risks depends on hard predictive judgments and
complex assessments of how to handle factual uncertainty. A reasonable
legislature, even giving great weight to the interests of patients, might decide
that those risks are sufficient to justify a prohibition. A state could decide, with
reason, that a ban on physician-assisted suicide actually promotes the
autonomy of many or most people and in the process has salutary effects on
the norms and practices of the medical profession. Probably the simplest
169. See Ginsburg, supra note 113, at 381-86 (urging narrower holding in Roe); see also Sunstein,
supra note 72, at 49-50 (criticizing Roe for its "maximalism").
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opinion would assume for purposes of argument that the right to physician-
assisted suicide qualifies as a "fundamental right" while finding that the state
has sufficient reason to override that right.
It is hard to be comfortable with this conclusion. In actual cases, fully
competent people, joined by their loved ones, are seeking to terminate their
lives amidst hopeless conditions and an inevitable period of helplessness,
despair, and perhaps intense emotional or physical pain. Those of us who are
healthy are likely to have known people in such situations; those of use who
are healthy may eventually find ourselves in such situations. In cases of this
kind, an insistence on the abstract "right to life" can seem an egregious and
unnecessary cruelty, and the notion of "death with dignity" acquires immense
force. Lawyers and citizens should be aware that a judgment that people have
no constitutional right to commit some act does not mean that they do not
deserve, in the deepest moral sense, that very right. Undoubtedly doctors
should consult closely with patients, friends, and family members, and on
occasion, all will conclude that physician-assisted suicide is a merciful and
fully legitimate act. Sometimes they will reach this conclusion whatever the
technical content of state law, and in such cases prosecutors should tread very
cautiously indeed. And here we arrive at the heart of the matter. The argument
I have offered is institutional rather than substantive: It is not the Supreme
Court but these other arenas-state legislatures, prosecutors' offices, hospitals,
and private homes-that should decide whether, when, and how to legitimate
a "right to die."
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